In 1998, the British government conducted a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Three years later, the entire world got a very clear picture of what calamities terrorists could bring about, when the al-Qaeda network destroyed most of the World Trade Center in New York City. Because the United States had previously been such a welcoming country for incoming students, terrorists were able to get trained as pilots at American institutes. Because United States airport security had previously been somewhat more trusting, those same terrorists were able to use box cutters to intimidate passengers and airline employees, gaining entry into the cockpits of three passenger planes. The passengers on the fourth plane rose up and fought their oppressors, but the price was fatal. By the time that military responses could be coordinated, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had already been hit.

Paradigm shifts like this were part of the rationale behind the writing of the Defence White Paper entitled “Delivering Security in a Changing World” in 2003. The British government recognized a number of factors that necessitated changes in the ways that government agencies handled domestic security. According to the introduction to the white paper, it was “evident that the successful management of international security problems [would] require ever more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments at both national and international levels” (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). In other words, not only would countries have to be able to cooperate in ways that had not yet been possible in meeting the challenges of a common enemy, agencies within the same government would also have to work in concert swiftly to meet the challenges of terrorism, and there are many countries in which this interagency cooperation would prove more of a challenge than finding common ground with other countries. The improvement in military technologies was also a factor, which led those writing the paper to “look at how….new technologies [can] deliver military effects in different ways…[including] flexible forces able to configure to generate the right capability in a less predictable and more complex operational environment” (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). The goal of the white paper was to “move away from simplistic platform-centric planning to a fully ‘networked enabled capability’ able to exploit effects-based planning and operations, using forces which are truly adaptable, capable of even greater levels of precision, and rapidly deployable” (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). Clearly, some paradigm shifts were underway in the restructuring of British security.

Although the British government conducted another SDR in 2002, after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, there were other international events and factors that led to the writing of this white paper. The first one mentioned was the large number of small crises that were occurring all over the globe, including Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, Congo, and Iraq – all at once. Constructing a military to face two or three theaters, at most, would be outdated in the current security environment. Also, while theaters in past conflicts, such as the Falkland Islands, or even such conflicts that, at the time, seemed protracted (like the Second World War), ended up taking less time to resolve that some of these foreign crises have in the past decade. Also, the structure of NATO has changed, transitioning from a group of large, static forces to smaller response teams that can go outside the NATO territory. Similarly, the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has fragmented the size of response teams even further. Also, a strategic partnership with Russia could present a variety of demands, given the instability that, at times, has plagued Russia’s infrastructure, particularly their oil pipelines. The spreading of weapons of mass destruction around the world, and particularly the ease with which individuals and small groups, as opposed to nations, can create and develop these weaponry systems, are of specific concern to the British government. A positive factor that also served to highlight the need for this white paper was the emerging concepts and technologies surrounding such ideas Network Enhanced Capability (NEC) as well as precision weapons (Ministry of Defence 2003, pgs. 2-3).

There were a number of specific changes that resulted from the adoption of this white paper. In general, the British goal was to be able to handle three operations that were small to medium, at least one of which was a long-term peacekeeping excursion, along the lines of Kosovo. All three of these forces were expected to be able to act as the lead nation in coalition operations. Also, the British military sought to be able to deploy for a large-scale operation while running a small-scale operation simultaneously. As far as force-specific changes, those occurred as follows:

There were a significant number of reductions in forces and assets. The British Army lost 1,000 soldiers, the Royal Air Force lost 7,000 flyers, and the Royal Navy lost 1,500 sailors. Four battalions were removed from Northern Ireland and distributed to other areas of need. Several artillery batteries were lightened and moved. Smaller infantry battalions were combined into larger regiments. The Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System was purchased for three regiments. Three light-armoured squadrons were created for training on the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES), which is the next generation of armored vehicles. In the Royal Air Force, such older craft as the Nimrod MR-class and Tornado F3 were to be gradually replaced with such newer, more versatile equipment as the Typhoon and the Boeing C-17. The Rapier missile launchers were either blended in with the Army Royal Artillery, instead of keeping its old place in the Royal Air Force, or downsized. In the Royal Navy, such ships as the Type 45 destroyers, Type 23 frigates, nuclear attack subs and countermeasure vessels were downsized, because of the shrinking need for naval capacity in these kinds of conflicts. Most of the work for NATO and other security organizations is land-based only. The military budget was set to increase from almost 30 billion pounds in 2004/2005 to 33.4 billion pounds in 2007/2008, including 3 billion to be spent purchasing newer, more wieldy helicopters by 2015 (“Delivering Security…” 2007). More..